Bob1: "This useless drivel
is the same song that's been rehashed and played over
and over again. Its like taking all of the used porridge
from an orphanage mashing it together and then claiming
it as a new recipe for porridge. Pop music is vacuous
and without feeling, its intended to sell records
and make money for the record companies."
Bob2: "I can really understand
the pain and anguish that this troubled singer has
endured. He expresses himself uniquely and effectively
and it allows me access to his pain and in this way
I do not feel so alone. He is a talented musician
working on the edge to bring truth to the eternal
sorrows of mankind"
Disabusive Sophist: "I hate
people for Bob1 and Bob2 are not two separate entities,
(whatever that means) in fact, Bob1 and Bob2 are the
same entity. Bob is a hypocrite, at one point rejecting
the song, and in the next moment he accepts the song
"
What is really at stake here is model
construction. I suppose humans, and moralist for sure,
have gotten into the habit of believing models maintain
a certain degree of consistency. Case in point, that
rock in your hand, always seems to fall to the ground
when you drop it, in fact the very term 'drop' implies
that something will fall. But the point is that the
model, in this case gravity, consistently sends the
rock to the floor. For this gravity as a model is
seen to be consistent and predictable.
Such accountability would be nice
if applicable to humans, and so as it stands such
accountability in fact is applied to humans. In the
example given, about Bob depending on the model we
like of Bob, we call that the 'true' Bob. Appearance
of the other Bob causes a denouncement and proclamation
that the current Bob is not the legitimate Bob. This
can also be applied moralistically, when one behaves
consistent with the model the priest prefers, that
is the 'true' self, they are a 'good' 'moral' person.
However, when one acts contrary to the priest, they
are 'bad' and 'evil'. We already know from Nietzsche
that applying moral edicts of evilness to a human
only reveals that one declared as such, behaves contrary
to the preferences of those delivering the edict.
The priest wants Bob1, but gets Bob2 and so to explain
this deviation in behavior, Bob must be evil.
The problem with such a setup is
the implication that such a true self exists within
each person. How many times has one found themselves1
drawn and quartered by differing internal drives?
If singularity of consciousness were to exist then
why should their be deviations and argument within
the singular entity about what the entity should do.
Perhaps one may argue that indeed an entity may have
multiple drives, but that entity is marked by what
selects those drives. The entity resides in drives
that are expressed. Those making such an argument
error in failing to realize that expression in behaviour
of a drive already implies that one drive over the
other demanding expression has succeed in 'a will
to power' over the other drives. Hence they have not
proven a singular entity but have shown the consequence
of when one drive succeeds over another when demanding
expression. To talk in previous terminology the priest
attempts to pull out the drive, or model he prefers,
in the entity he is currently working with. Again
we return to the problem of viewing a humans as a
singular entity.
Humans sure as hell aren't singular
entities. To state what may be my most important thesis,
human beings are a collection of drives that vary
as a function of their environment. Drive expression
depends on the both transient and state affects that
power one drive over another. This is obviously the
case in instances of hunger, some type of physiological
affect powers the drive to consume, such that behaviour
and thought express such a drive. One imagines the
puppet master capable of pulling certain strings bringing
out certain drives in an entity causing a transformation
in behaviour and thought. We are victims of our drives.
Complicating the fact that a human
is not a singular entity is that, a human is not a
singular entity. Let me explain. Humans vary as a
function of the drives that control them, but now
a human attempting to understand another human being
is restricted in the same way. Hence, model construction
of one human, whose behavior varies as a function
of drive expression, also is modified by the drive
expression of the human constructing the model. Explaining
the behaviour of another requires understanding both
the drive of the person emitting the behaviour and
understanding the drive that is attempting to explain
that behaviour.
In administering punishment, its
convenient to believe in a singular entity, for the
simple matter that you want the punishment to affect
the drive that behaved deviantly Commonly, punishing
an entity for its deviant behaviour places the retribution
on the wrong drive. Assuming the drive came to fruition,
then it satiated what its desire, if this is the case
then its power base has been depleted, and as such
is no longer the expressed drive. Punishment is placed
on another drive, one that shares no direct relationship
with the drive. If this is the case, then we would
no longer be able to justify the administration of
punishment. Instead we demand singularity from our
entities to maintain justification of punishment.
To certain extent such a belief is justified given
the fact that a sever enough punishment will give
enough power to a drive such that it has certain degree
of staying power over the 'deviant' drive.
But now what about our friend Bob
and his contradictory feelings of Nickelback? Explanation
seems pretty clear at this point, Bob2 or should we
say Drive2 express itself in behavior and thought
that is consistent with what is expressed in Nickeback's
How You Remind Me. In this way, he can sympathize
and understand Nickelback poistion and from it comes
admiration. On the other hand, Bob1 operates within
in a cynical social circle. Drive to cynicism is more
easily expressed for this reason mockery of Nickelback
occurs.
